Forge 2005 Serial Key Keygen
The method of Stevens cannot forge a certificate from an existingcertificate because the second preimage attack of MD5 is hard so far. Themethod needs to construct two certificates based on chosen-prefix collisionattack of MD5 before submitting one of them to apply for a certificate to aCA. The implementation of the process has two key issues, one related to thecollision pair construction of MD5 and the other to some fields controlled byCAs, such as serial number, in certificates, which attackers need to predictbefore submitting the application. Against the threat, Stevens gave twosuggestions for CAs: one is to replace MD5 algorithm with other secure hashalgorithms (such as SHA-256) because chosen-prefix collision of other hashalgorithms does not occur at present; the other is to add a sufficient amountof fresh randomness at the appropriate fields (such as serial number) inorder to prevent attackers from predicting if MD5 cannot be replaced at once[5]. In the wild, however, many valid certificates still use MD5 [9]. Inaddition, we grabbed 180,000+ certificates from Internet, while 5000+certificates are based on MD5, in other words 2.8% certificates.
Forge 2005 Serial Key Keygen
In the paper, we found the vulnerability during OpenSSL'sgenerating the serial number of X.509 certificates. It is possible to forgecertificates based on the method presented by Stevens. Similarly, EJBCA andNSS have the same vulnerability among other 5 open source libraries.
Although MD5 has been replaced by CAs now, with the development oftechnology, new attacks for current hash algorithm adopted by CAs, such asSHA-256, will probably occur in the future. If the chosen-prefix collision ofsome hash algorithm occurs, the threat will work again probably. In thatcase, attackers still need to predict the value of fields controlled by CAsin order to construct forged certificates. Thus, the randomness of the serialnumber is important for CAs too.